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"THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE":
RECONCILING COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL
INTERESTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Profcsor Doernberg examines a tension within fourth amendment jurisprudence
and sugqests a means of resolving it. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has
conferred fourth amendment standing only upon those whose personal privacy
interests have been disturbed. On the other hand, the Court has allowed such
persons to incoke the exclun'onary rule only in circumstances where, in the Court's
d e w , it would serve as an effective deterrent. Professor Doernberg traces these two
po1icie.s to different conceptions of the fourth amendment: the first interprets the
amendment as a guarantor of individual rights; the second construes it as an instrument for securing a collective right. He then shows how the Court, by oscillating
betuteen theye two conceptions, has eroded fourth amendment protections more
severely than it could have done under either conception. The author suggests that
the atombtic and collectice oiews of the fourth amendment be harmonized and sets
forth a uiew of the proper scope of standing to invoke the exclusionary remedy under
a dualistic conception of fourth amendment rights.

It has been observed that "[tlhe fourth amendment cases are a
mess,"I and, in a more restrained tenor, that "[flor clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's
~ the years since Professors Dworkin and
most successful p r ~ d u c t . "In
Amsterdam made those observations, the situation has not improved.
As recently as 1981, the Court was badly split on two cases involving
automobile searches decided the same day,3 which generated one
majority opinion, one plurality opinion, three brief concurrences, four
dissents, and opposite results. That situation led one Justice to decry
"the problems of wrestling with this Court's twisting and turning as it
makes decisional law applying the Fourth Amendment . . . [and the]
burdensome and frequently futile efforts . . necessary to predict the
'correct' result in a particular case."4

.

'Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., 1966, Yale University; J.D., 1969,
Columbia University.
The author gratefully acho~vledgesthe research assistance of Cathleen Walsh and the
thoughtful editorial suggestions of Professor Donald H. Zeigler.
Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering,
48 Ind. L.J. 329, 329 (1973).
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 349 (1974).
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
Robbinr was overruled by United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
' Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 443-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The fourth amendment was intended both to protect the rights of
individuals and to prevent the government from functioning as in a
police state. One of those goals is clearly personal: the other more
generalized. Both the individual and collective view are partially
correct. The Court has overtly espoused only an individualized view
of the amendment, emphasizing personal privacy interests.Anthony
Amsterdam has argued, however, that the fourth amendment should
be read as a broad regulation of government conduct in society.l' This
view implies a broad, collective purpose for the amendment, a mandate to preserve an open society:
The evil [addressed by the Framers] was general: it nras the creation of an administration of public justice that authorized and
supported indiscriminate searching and seizing. It was against such
a regime of public justice that the fourth amendment uras set. I do
not think that the phraseology of the amendment, akin to that of
the first and second amendments and the ninth, is accidental. It
speaks of "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The vice of a system of criminal justice that relies upon a
professional police and admits evidence they obtain by unreasonable searches and seizures is precisely that we are all thereby made
less secure in our persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and s e i ~ u r e s . ~

The two phrases, "the right of the people," and "to be secure,""
should guide those seeking fully to understand the fourth amendment.
They imply that the amendment is a broad limitation on government;
freedom from unreasonable searches is a constitutionalljr mandated
social state. The collective view, though not endorsed by the Court, is
implicit in many aspects of its fourth amendment decisions.
Two general areas of fourth amendment jurisprudence, corresponding to the individual and social aspects of the fourth amendment, have been of central focus over the past twenty years. First, the
Court has repeatedly considered the question of who should be permitted to raise fourth amendment issues and in what contests litigation of such issues should be permitted. These issues have, until reSee test accompanying notes 18-70 infra.
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 367. Amsterdam calls for "new regulatory devices . . that
can be created and maintained in working order only by the stimulation and the oversight of
courts enforcing constitutional law." Id. at 380. He views the fourth amendment as properly a
"regulatory canon requiring government to order its lam enforcement procedures in a fashion
that keeps us collectively secure in our persons, houses, papers and effects." Id. at 367.
Id. at 432-33.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.

.
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cently, been discussed under the rubric of tan ding.^ Second, the
Court has, particularly in the past decade, examined the question of
when the exclusionary rule, developed by the judiciary as a remedy
for violations of fourth amendment rights,1° should be applied or
withheld in individual cases.ll The Court's treatment of fourth
amendment law in these invo areas has been doctrinally incoherent,
drawing some highly critical reviews from commentator^.'^ When
considering a defendant's standing, the Court has tended to treat
fourth amendment rights as being held only by individuals,13 not by
society at large. This has led the Court to reject a number of fourth
amendment challenges, not because the police behavior in question
was reasonable or lawful, but because the individual did not fit into
the narrow standing confines established by the Court. At the same
time, the Court asserts that the remedy is not for the indiSidual at all14
but rather is invoked for the benefit of society's interest in deterring
government behavior which violates the fourth amendment.l5 Thus
even where standing is uncontested, the exclusionary rule is not applied unless the Court feels that its application would significantly
deter future government abuses of fourth amendment rights. Given
this dichotomy in the theoretical underpinnings of the Court's fourth
amendment cases, inconsistency is hardly a surprising result.
This Article examines the inconsistency in the Court's treatment
of fourth amendment rights and remedies and explores the basis for
eliminating that inconsistency by recognizing the collective aspect of
the fourth amendment. Section I first discusses the development of the

'' Rakas v. United States, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), announced that the vocabulary of standing is
inappropriate for fourth amendment questions, ruling instead that the proper inquiry is whether
the defendant's substantive fourth amendment rights were violated. Id. at 138-40. See test
accompanying notes 46-53 infra. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, even on some occasions
speaking through Justice Rehnquist, the author of Rakas, continues to discus these issues in
terms of standing, see, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,85-97 (1980); United States v.
Paper, 447 U.S. 727,737-38.74s (1980); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,761 n.8 (1979), as
do the lower federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Kember, 648 F.2d 1354, 1365-66 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Mazzelli, 595
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Conway, 448
U.S. 902 (1980). This Article will use standing terminology for convenience.
l" United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
l 1 See generally test accompanying notes 71-125 infra.
l-ee,
e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 2; Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth
Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 Or. L. Rev. 151 (1979).
l-ee generally test accompanying notes 18-70 infra.
l 4 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See test accompanying note 116 infra.
l5 See test accompanying notes 114-25 infra.
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Court's current doctrines allowing individuals to raise fourth amendment issues. It then reviews the development of the exclusionary rule,
the purposes of the rule as developed in the Court's cases, and the
Court's recent refusals to allow the remedy to be invoked in some cases
where the individual claiming its protection clearly has standing to do
so.16 Finally, Section I demonstrates that the Court in recent years has
oscillated between individual and collective views in the fourth
amendment area, but always in such a way as to narrow the amendment's effective ambit.
Section I1 explores the dichotomy in the Court's approach and
points out that were the Court to view fourth amendment rights and
remedies consistently as being either individual or collective, the effective scope of the fourth amendment as a limitation upon governmental excesses would be greater. For example, if the Court considered
collective concerns in fourth amendment cases, standing would have
to be expanded to encompass those concerns, which transcend purely
personal injuries. Conversely, if the Court were to consider individual
deprivations of rights in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary
rule remedy, it could no longer withhold the remedy simply because it
created no broader deterrent effect.
Next, Section I1 suggests that the dichotomy be eliminated by
consistently regarding the fourth amendment as contemplating collective as well as individual rights. This full protection of fourth amendment values requires substantial changes in the concept of standing to
raise fourth amendment issues. The Article suggests that the collective
component of the fourth amendment can be protected only by resurrecting a standing concept mentioned in one of the early standing
cases: l7 the target of the search, i.e., the person against whom the
government proposes to use illegally seized evidence, should be permitted to challenge use of the fruits of the search in a subsequent
criminal proceeding. The Court's resistance to this articulation of the
standing concept is based on its assertion that there are no fourth
amendment rights of the individual to be protected in such a situation. This is, however, only half the issue. If there are collective
rights, they too must be protected, and the Court itself has repeatedly
recognized that only the exclusionary rule provides an effective enforcement mechanism.

IB

l7

See text accompanying notes 114-25 infra.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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A. The Right to Raise Fourth Amendment Issues
The law of standing to raise fourth amendment issues has had a
tortured history. The Supreme Court has long taken the position that
constitutional rights may not ordinarily be vicariously asserted, that
constitutional remedies may be had only by "the class for whose sake
the constitutional protection is given."18 Current fourth amendment
standing doctrine embodies a highly restricted concept of that standard. The defendant wishing to suppress seized evidence must show
that his personal right, his exyectation of privacy from the whole
world, was violated by government action.lg Neither a reasonable
es~ectationof privacy from government alone,20nor ownership of the
seized eviden~e,~l
nor being the target of a searchz2suffices to accord
him standing.
Standing has not always been so restrictively viewed. In Jones v.
United S t a t q Z 3the first case in which the Court explicitly considered
standing,2J the Court took a broad approach. Jones had been staying
in a friend's apartment searched without probable cause and was
charged with possession of narcotics found there. The government,
relying upon the law as it had developed in the lower courts, argued
lH Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152,160 (1907). Accord Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969). In some circumstances, however, individuals may assert others' rights, particularly if
there is no other effective enforcement mechanism for those rights. See note 184 infra.
InProfessor Amsterdam, supra note 2, has called this the "atomistic" approach to the fourth

amendment. The Court has not always been consistent in this regard. In Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364 (196S), the Court esplicitly recognized that an individual might espect privacy

from governmental intrusion, but not from the intrusion of coworkers. See test accompanying
notes 32-37 infra.
"'See test accompanying notes 33-35, 60-66 infra.
See test accompanying notes 55-60, 68 infra.
" See test accompanying notes 38-46 infra.
" 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
24 The Court noted that the lower federal courts had considered standing and had "generally
required that the movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have
had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched." Id. at 261. See, e.g., Steeber v.
United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952); Connolly v. hledalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932).
See generally hlickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois: From Property
to Privacy and Back, 16 New Eng. L. Rev. 197 (1981), suggesting that prior to Jones, the Court
had simply considered standing to be a function of property rights and had not discussed it,
escept in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), which made the equivalence clear.
Professor hlickenberg recognizes Jones as the appropriate determinant of standing because of its
acceptance of privacy concepts instead of reliance upon property rules. hiickenberg, supra, at
20s.
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(1)that unless Jones were willing to claim ownership of the narcotics,
he had too little interest in their seizure to object to their introduction
in evidence, and (2) that Jones had insufficient interest in the premises
to object to a search of them, since he was a mere guest or invitee. The
Court immediately recognized the irony of the first argument: to
establish standing to make his suppression motion, the defendant was,
in effect, required to convict himself on the merits.25 To avoid this
dilemma, the Court fashioned what would later become known as the
automatic standing rule: a defendant charged with a possessory crime
lvas automatically permitted to challenge seizure of the evidence upon
which the charge was based.2s Thus the nature of the charge against
the defendant, whether or not it arose from a search involving his
personal property, could provide the basis for his standing to seek
s u p p r e s s i ~ nIn
. ~ ~dictum, the Court addressed the government's second argument. It suggested that being the target of a search might
itself suffice to confer standing on Jones. Under such a target theory,
standing would be extended to "anyone legitimately on the premises
when a search occurs . . [if] its fruits are proposed to be used against

.

362 U.S. at 261-62.
Id. at 263-64. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93 n.7 (1980); Broxvn v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223, 228 (1973); which made clear that the Court did not view the automatic
standing rule as applicable to nonpossessory crimes. Automatic standing was o\,erruled by
Solvucci in 1980. 448 U.S. at 85.
In the interim, the dilemma which caused the Court to create the automatic standing rule
had been diminished in another way by Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), which
held that a defendant's testimony in a suppression hearing was not admissible against him at trial
on issues of guilt or innocence. Id. at 394. In fact, part of the majority's rationale in Solrjurci for
overruling the automatic standing rule was that Simmons had made automatic standing unnecessary. 448 U.S. at 89-90. The Simmons Court did not, however, state that a defendant's
suppression hearing testimony cannot be used against him on questions other than guilt or
innocence, such as credibility. That omission left open the possibility that Simmon~affords a
defendant less protection than did the automatic standing rule of Jones, which allolved defendants to seek suppression without having to testify at all. Cf. Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714
(1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (both holding that defendants' inconsistent
statements taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are admissible for
purposes of impeachment). This question, in fact, was specifically resewed by the Court in
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94 (1980).
27 Jones also rejected the government's first argument that an individual lacked standing for
fourth amendment purposes unless he could show ownership of the searched premises or some
other legally cognizable form of control over them, such as being their lessee, 362 U.S. at 266,
suggesting instead that anyone legitimately on the searched premises had standing to object to
use of the fruits of the search. Id. at 267. This theory was finally rejected in Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978). Thus the Jones Court repudiated the idea that standing to challenge a search
and seizure should be governed by what it called "'subtle distinctions, developed and refined by
the common law in evolving the body of private property law." 362 U.S. at 266.
26
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him."2B Thus the individual with the greatest practical interest in
challenging a search would be entitled to do so.
The Court expanded upon Jones in 1968, in Manczcsi v.
D e F ~ r t eDeforte,
.~~
seeking a writ of habeas corpus following his state
conviction on conspiracy, coercion, and extortion charges in connection with his union job, objected to evidentiary use of papers seized
from his union office.30The Court upheld DeForte's standing, noting
that Jon& had explicitly discarded reliance upon private property law
concepts as the keys to standinge31It cited Katz v. United States32as
making "it clear that capacity to claim the protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon
whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation
~ ~ the Court wedded
of freedom from governmental i n t r ~ s i o n . "Thus
the Jones holding to the expectation of privacy rationale as it had
developed in more recent cases. By so holding, the Court reaffirmed
two fourth amendment concepts: (1)ownership of the seized evidence
was not required to confer standing provided the individual had a
sufficient relationship with the premises from which it was seized;34
and (2) neither title nor a formally recognizable property interest in
the premises where the search occurred was required to give the
individual standing.35 The Court thereby reaffirmed that a defendant's legitimate presence on the premises would suffice to create standing for fourth amendment purposes.
The Court, in elaborating its privacy rationale, explicitly recognized that an individual might legitimately harbor different expectations of privacy with respect to the government than with respect to
private individuals. The Court held that DeForte was entitled to
expect that the papers in question would be available only to his
coworkers and union superiors, not to government official^.^^ The
362 U.S. at 267.
392 U.S. 364 (1968).
Id. at 365.
31 Id. at 369.
32 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33 392 U.S. at 368.
34 Id. at 367. The papers belonged to the union, not to DeForte himself.
35 Id. at 367-69.
3n Id. at 369-70. DeForte shared his office with other union officials. The state and Justice
Black's dissent argued that DeForte's esyectation of privacy (and hence his fourth amendment
interest) mas diminished by that fact and that he therefore lacked standing. Brief for Petitioner,
hlancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), cited in 20 L. Ed. 2d 1715.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, argued that DeForte allowed an individual to assert
someone else's constitutional rights because DeForte did not own the seized records (they were
the union's) and did not have exclusive control over the place from which they were seized. 392

'
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Court recognized that expectations of privacy might be relativeapplicable to some intrusions but not all. Specifically, the majority
recognized that the expectation of privacy against the government is
qualitatively different from that against private individuals and found
support for that distinction in the facts of Jones.37
In Alderman v . United States,38the Court considered suppression
motions made by persons who did not have even the limited interest in
the searched premises asserted by DeForte. The Court rejected their
claims, making it clear that standing concepts would not extend so
far.39 Petitioners had been convicted of conspiracy to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce40 and, in another case consolidated for argument, of conspiring to transmit national defense informati0n.4~In both cases, the government relied in part upon evidence
procured by electronic eavesdropping which petitioners alleged violated the fourth amendment. Petitioners fell into three groups: persons
whose conversations had been overheard, persons who owned or
leased the premises in which the conversations were overheard, and
persons implicated by the conversations. The Court held that only the
first two groups had standing, the first because their conversational
privacy was invaded42 and the second because a homeowner has
standing to object to use of any evidence seized from within his
premises.43 The third group was held to lack standing because its

U.S. at 373-74. Justice Black also urged that Jones' legitimately-on-the-premisestest nrasfar too
broad because it permitted such vicarious assertion of constitutional rights. The majority's
response was to focus on DeForte's esrpectation of privacy from governmental intrusion by
analogizing his case to those involving searches of private (as opposed to shared) offices. 392 U.S.
at 369.
37 Id. at 370. The Court again exrplicitly recognized this proposition, though in a different
contest, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388.
390-95 (1971), allowing an individual to assert a claim for damages against federal officers who
demanded and received entry to his home, even though the Court noted that a traditional action
in trespass might have failed because the entry was acquiesced in by the homeowner in submksion to asserted federal authority. Thus the Court recognized that official intrusion is different in
kind, not merely in degree, from private intrusion. California has also recognized and retained
this distinction. People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
38 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
39 "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional
rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Id. at 174 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968)); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). But see note 184 infra.
40 394 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 169.
42 Id. at 176.
43 The Court recognized that houses are explicitly protected by the fourth amendment.
If the police make an unwarranted search of a house and seize tangible property belonging
to third parties-even a transcript of a third-party conversation-the homeowner may
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members had no relationship to the premises, or to the wiretapped
conversations, beyond being mentioned in them.44
By denying the third group of petitioners standing, the Court
implicitly rejected the target theory hinted at in Jones. Those petitioners argued that, since they were the target of the FBI investigation,
they were persons "against whom the search was directed and thus
had standing. But Alderman held that petitioners' connection with the
seized conversations was too tenuous:
What petitioners appear to assert is an independent constitutional right of their own to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. But we think there is a substantial difference for
constitutional purposes between preventing the incrimination of a
defendant through the very evidence illegally seized from him. and
suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot claim
this predicate for

The majority thus underscored its view of the personal nature of the
rights encompassed by the fourth amendment.
The nest major development came in Rakas v. Illinois.46The car
in which petitioners were passengers was stopped and searched by
police investigating a robbery, and evidence found was introduced
against petitioners over their objection. The Illinois courts ruled that,
because petitioners did not own the car, they lacked standing to
challenge the search.47 In affirming the convictions, the Supreme
Court made three distinct pronouncements concerning fourth amendment standing. First, the Court explicitly rejected the target theory of
standing derived from Jones." Second, the Court repudiated the Jones
concept that any person legitimately on the searched premises had

object to its use against him, not because he had any interest in the seized items as 'effects'
protected by the Fourth Amendment, but because they were the fruits of an unauthorized
search of his house, which is itself ex~resslyprotected by the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 176-77 (footnote omitted). Of course nothing guarantees that the homeowner will win
such a challenge; it is merely established that he will be allowed to make it.
a Id. at 171-76.
45 Id. at 174.
'"439 U.S. 128 (1978).
47 People v. Rakas, 46 Ill. App. 3d 569, 360 N.E. 2d 1252 (1977).
"'39
U.S. at 135 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)). The Court
disposed of petitioners' interpretation of Jones' target language quickly: "[That] language was
meant merely as a parenthetical equivalent of the previous phrase 'a victim of a search or
seizure.' To the estent that the language might be read more broadly, it is dictum which was
impliedly repudiated in Alderman u. United States,
and which we now eqressly reject."
439 U.S. at 135.

...
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standing to object to the use of illegally seized evidence.49The majority stated that this formula extended fourth amendment protections
far beyond the scope of the problems with which the amendment was
intended to deal. The Rakas majority insisted that protecting reasonable expectations of privacy is the only proper aim of the amendment50 and declared that not everyone legitimately on the premises
enjoyed the same (or any) expectation of privacy as someone with a
legally recognized possessory right.51Third, the majority rejected the
vocabulary of standing in fourth amendment cases, declaring that the
question of standing was in fact merely a masquerading question of
the existence of fourth amendment substantive rights.52At the same
time, Justice Rehnquist was careful to insist that the change in vocabulary would not itself work any substantive change.S3Rakas left courts
confronted with fourth amendment issues only two questions to answer: whether the moving party had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place searched and, if so, whether the police acted
unreasonably in conducting the search.
Later cases showed how difficult it would be to establish the first
element. The Rakas reformulation of the fourth amendment inquiry
has effectively restricted fourth amendment standing to a narrow
personal zone of privacy with the concomitant result that many intrusive and unlawful searches cannot now be remedied. In United States
v . S a l v ~ c c i for
, ~ ~example, defendants sought to suppress evidence
that the police had seized from an apartment belonging to neither of
them but to which one had unrestricted access. In denying suppression, the Court used its expectation of privacy analysis expressly to
overrule the Jones rule granting automatic standing for possessory
offenses.55Even acknowledged ownership of the seized items failed to
confer standing: "We simply decline to use possession of a seized good
as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area ~ e a r c h e d . " ~ T h u s
Salvucci demonstrates that the legitimate expectation of privacy de49 439 U.S. at 142 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960)). The Raka\
Court noted with disapproval that virtually all lower courts had applied the Jones language
broadly. 439 U.S. at 142 n.lO.
439 U.S. at 143, 147.
5' Id. at 148. In effect, the Court held that passengers have no fourth amendment rights with
respect to vehicles or their contents.
52 Id. at 139.
53 Id. There is considerable reason to suspect that the new expectation-of-privacy analysis
does change some cases' results. See note 57 infra.
" 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
55 Id. at 85.
56 Id. at 92.
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pends largely upon ownership of the seized premises and may not
easily extend to others.57
Rawlings v. K e n t ~ c k y decided
,~~
the same day as Salvucci, confirmed that property rights heavily influence standing. Kentucky police officers, arriving at a house to execute an arrest warrant, thought
they smelled marijuana and decided to obtain a search warrant. The
person named in the arrest warrant was absent, but in the meantime,
the occupants of the house, including David Rawlings and Vanessa
Cox, were told they could depart only if they consented to body
searchess9 One of the officers subsequently returned with a search
warrant and in executing it discovered contraband secreted in Cox's
purse, which had been on a sofa between Cox and Rawlings.
Rawlings admitted ownership of the drugs and was subsequently
convicted over his protest that the search of the purse and seizure of
the drugs had violated the fourth amendment.
Affirming the conviction, the Court ruled that his asserted ownership of the seized items was insufficient to confer standing since they
were not seized from an area in which he had a reasonable exiectation of priva~y.~"
The Court relied in part upon Ralvlings' statement

Salcucci also strongly contradicts Justice Rehnquist's assertion in Rakas that the new,
nonstanding vocabulary of fourth amendment analysis will not affect how cases are decided.
Salcucci, typical of the Court's recent cases, fails to deal with the distinction behveen a person's
expectation of privacy from the world at large and his expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion, the distinction mentioned in Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). See text
accompanying notes 36-37 supra. Yet in terms of an e~pectationof freedom from governmental
intrusion, Salcucci is difficult to distinguish from DeForte. In both cases, the evidence was seized
from an area not owned by the defendant but to which he had been given unrestricted access by
the owner. In both cases, the owner or his agents presumably retained the right to enter the area.
Nonetheless, DeForte, decided prior to Rakas, allowed the defendant to challenge the search,
while Salcucci, decided after, did not.
5Y 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
Id. at 100. Two people did consent to be searched and then left. Whether consent obtained
in such circumstances should be regarded as truly voluntary, and thus effective to waive the
constitutional right, mas not addressed by the Court, since no one who "consented" to the search
mas found to possess contraband. It is at least arguable that such a consent would be ineffective.
See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
From the outset in the Kentucky courts, and subsequently in the Supreme Court, Rawlings
maintained that to detain casual occupants of the house while the police sought to obtain a
warrant was unlawful. But cf. hiichigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (temporary detention
of owner whose house mas already the subject of a search warrant while the warrant was
executed held permissible). The Kentucky courts did not address the issue, however, and the
Supreme Court assumed that the detention was illegal because, on the majority's view of the
case, the constitutional violation was irrelevant to Ralvlings' situation. 448 U.S. at 106-10. But
see note 60 infra.
4.18 U.S. at 105-06. The majority did not explain why Rawlings did not have a sufficient
fourth amendment interest because of the constitutional guarantee that effects may not be
unreasonably seized. See test accompanying note 68 infra. The Court's assertion that Ralvlings'
'IJ
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that he did not expect the police to respect the privacy of Cox's purseti1
but went beyond that to make clear that, even had he entertained a
subjective expectation of privacy, the Court would have refused to
recognize it because Rawlings had not known Cox long;62 he had
never before had access to her purse;63 he had no right to exclude
others from the purse;64 and he took no precautions to maintain the
privacy.65 Rawlings completed the burial of the concept of relative
.~~
Rawlings may
privacy derived from Mancusi v. D e F o ~ t e Though
not have anticipated total privacy vis-k-vis Cox and her invitees, he
may nonetheless have expected that the government would be excluded. But as Rakas, Salvucci, and Rawlings now make clear, expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion is not sufficient to
bring the fourth amendment into play; the new doctrine of standing
requires expectation of freedom from any intrusion. Thus the Court
intensified its view of the personal nature of fourth amendment rights.
These cases clearly contemplate that the rights secured by the
fourth amendment are individual rather than a "right of the people"
collectively held.07 At the same time, the Court has indicated how
extraordinarily limited in scope those individual rights are. Mere ownership of seized property is insufficient to invoke them despite the
amendment's guarantee that effects shall not be unreasonably

unlawful detention is constitutionally irrelevant, 448 U.S. at 106, underscores the tight restrictions the Court has imposed upon fourth amendment rights. The Court, faced with taro illegal
detentions (Rawlings' and Cox's), implicitly held that his unlawful detention yielded no fruits to
be suppressed. By contrast, Cox's unlawful detention, which did produce the fruits ultimately
used to convict Rawlings, was not a predicate for suppression on Rawlings' behalf, though
presumably it was available to Cox.
448 U.S. at 104. It can be argued, however, that Rawlings' statement is ambiguous. He
may have meant, as a legal matter, that he knew that, under the Court's recent pronouncements
in the fourth amendment area, he would not be regarded as having a legitimate expectation of
privacy in Cox's purse. This is, of course, the meaning relied upon by the majority in asserting
that' he had no subjective expectation of privacy. On the other hand, he may have been stating as
a purely predictive, nonlegal matter that he knew the police would violate the privacy of Cosb
purse. Either construction is possible from the exchange noted in the Court's opinion, id. at 104
n.3, and only the former supports the Court's inference that Rawlings was not seeking to keep
the drugs private when he placed them in Cox's purse.
6 V d . at 105.
63 Id.
Id.
BS Id.
g6 392 U.S. 364 (1968). See text accompanying notes 29-37supra.
s7 Compare, for example, the wording of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. U.S.
Const. amends. IV, V, VI. The latter two are clearly addressed to rights held by an individual,
whereas the fourth amendment discusses a right of "the people." See text accompanying notes 6-7
supra.
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seized.e8Mere permission of the owner of searched premises to store
To raise a fourth amendone's personalty is similarly insuffi~ient.~~
ment claim, a defendant apparently must show that he is entitled to a
reasonable espectation of privacy from the whole world in the
searched premises.70 In all other cases, where the defendant cannot
demonstrate invasion of that narrow range of personal interest, the
government may use the fruits of searches repugnant to the concerns
of the fourth amendment. Society's interest in being free from such
intrusive governmental conduct goes unvindicated. By neglecting that
societal interest in the standing contest, the Court renders its standing
cases irreconcilable with its esclusionary rule cases, which are largely
based on that collective rationale.

B. The Exclusionary Rule and Its Purposes
The esclusionary rule, which implements the fourth and fourcommands that "evidence obtained by searches
teenth arnendment~,~~
This apparent conflict behveen the Court's holding in Rawlings and the wording of the
fourth amendment itself was the subject of a bitter dissent. Rawvlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
114-21 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
7" The Court's continued emphasis of the requirement that a person have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched is difficult to reconcile with its persistent assertion
that the fourth amendment "protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 (1967). See also Smith v. hiaryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977): Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Katz, Justice Stewvart's majority opinion made clear
the Court's dissatisfaction with counsel's fourth amendment arguments eqressed in terms of
"coristitutiondlp protected areas," 389 U.S. at 351-53, though he noted that the Court itself may
have contributed to the confusion in terminology. Id. at 351 n.9.
The recent standing cases raise a substantial question about the "people, not places" masim
of Katz. As one circuit has noted, it is impossible to speak of people9sGpectat$ns of privacy
wvithout some reference to the place or area in which the entitlement to privacy occurs. United
States v. BeUina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1339-40 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). See also Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 1974):
"The maxim of Katz that the fourth amendment protects 'people not places' is only of limited
usefulness, for in considering what people can reasonably e s ~ e cto
t maintain as private we must
inevitably speak in terms of places." But the Court seems to have gone much further than would
be required merely by the constraints of language. For esample, in United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83 (19SO), the majority, overruling Jones' automatic standing rule, referred almost exclus i d y to the place searched. See test accompanying note 56 supra. See also Rawvlings v. Kentucky, 453 U.S. 98 (1980). In short, an individual's relationship to the seized item appears
irrelevant for fourth amendment purposes. Ownership does not help him if he has no privacy
interest in the place searched. See test accompanying notes 55-56,60 supra. hloreover, the Court
has firmly rejected the idea, suggested by Jones, that an individual has standing merely because
he is the target of the search. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 134-35. See test accompanying notes
46-53 supra. Thus recent cases strongly suggest the conclusion that instead of protecting "people
not places," the fourth amendment today protects places, not people.
'' U.S. Const. amends. IV and SIV.
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and seizures in violation of the Constitution . . . is inadmi~sible."~
The rule did not exist at common law; 73 it is disdained by some of the
present members of the
and by representatives of the executive branch.75 In its practical operation, it does in fact appear to
embody the result Cardozo feared: "The criminal is to go free because
~~
as the unanimous Court
the constable has b l ~ n d e r e d . "However,
that devised the rule in Weeks v . United States77recognized:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
t;,us placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constituti~n.~~
" ' a p p v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961). Actually, the question of what may be done with
illegally seized evidence has been greatly complicated by recent Court decisions discursinr:
individuals' standing to raise fourth amendment issues. At this point, it certainly is clear that the
broad statement of hfapp is not accurate; as Rakas and the other standing cases demonstrate,
illegally seized evidence can be used by the government in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Unitcd
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (evidence admissible at trial against defendant with no
expectation of privacy in the place searched); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)
(evidence admissible in civil tax proceeding brought by taxpayer); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974) (evidence usable by grand jury as foundation for questions to defendant):
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (evidence usable at trial for impeachment of
defendant). See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra; text accompanying notes 114-2.5 infra.
73 See People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 24, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926).
74 See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437-44 (1981) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting):
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-502 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Coolidge r. Ncu,
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,510 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
See also id. at 490-92 (Harlan, J., concurring).
It was not always thus. One commentator, in fact, has made special note that the Court.
although it divided in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1981), over applying the rule to the states,
retained the W e e k s consensus about the rule itself:
[Tlhe Court's division in the case, sharp as it was [five to four], did not concern the merit.
of the exclusionary rule. The disagreement concerned only the federal dimension of the
constitutional question: should the states be left free to apply or not to apply the esclusionary rule according to state law? That is the issue on which the justices divided, and there is
not a word in the dissenting opinions suggesting that the rule is intrinsically bad.
T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 20-21 (1969).
75 See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime Final Report 55-56 (1981).
78 People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13,21,150 N.E. 585,587 (1926). As some commentators have
pointed out, however, the reasoning of Cardozo's statement is flawed. The criminal is to go free
not because the constable blundered but because, had the constable acted lau~fully,the criminal
could not have been identified and convicted in the first place. "[Aln after-the-fact prohibition
'prevents convictions in no greater degree than would effective prior direction to police to search
only by legal means.' " Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle
to hlake the Fourth Amendment More Than "An Empty Blessing," 62 Judicature 337.344 (1979)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure. 58 Yalc L.J.
144, 161 (1948)).
77 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
78 Id. at 393.
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At least at its inception, therefore, the exclusionary rule was viewed as
the only effective way to give life to the guarantees of the fourth
amendment.
This section traces the development of the exclusionary rule and
examines the purposes behind the rule expressed by the Court. The
rule originally served as a remedy for violations of individual rights, a
guarantor of judicial integrity, and perhaps a deterrent to future
fourth amendment violation^.^^ More recent cases, however, have
invoked only the last consideration. The Court has substantially abandoned the judicial integrity themeS0and has instructed that the exclusionary rule esists not to vindicate personal rights of the victim of an
unlawful search and seizure but rather to protect the collective interest of society in deterring fourth amendment violation^.^^ Thus when
the Court has concluded that the deterrent effect of suppression would
be minimal, it has refused to suppress seized evidence despite violation
of the defendant's fourth amendment rights.
1. Development of the Exclusions y Rule
The rule, as noted above, originated in Weeks v. United States.82
Weeks was arrested and charged with using the mails to operate a
lottery. Local police officers conducted a warrantless search of his
house, seizing certain papers and articles which they delivered to the
United States marshal, who later conducted another warrantless
search and seizure. Weeks' petition for return of the seized materials
prior to trial was denied, and his ensuing conviction was ultimately
reviewed by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the marshal's
seizure had violated Weeks' fourth amendment rights and that he had
been entitled to have the materials returned before trial. The conviction was reversed.s3 The exclusionary rule had been born.84

7s'

Id.

'"See United States v.

Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), discussed at test accompanying notes
168-76 infra.
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), discussed at test accompanying notes
114-19 infra.
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
" The Court's order did not, however, preclude the possibility of Weeks being retried
without the returned evidence. The Court did distinguish behveen the evidence seized by the
local police and presented to federal authorities on a "silver platter," see Lustig v. United States,
338 U.S. 7 4 7 9 (1949), overruled, Ellrins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and the evidence
seized by the marshal himself, directing return only of the latter on the ground that the fourth
amendment did not protect the defendant from the acts of local officials. The Court thus
established the basis for the silver platter doctrine. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914). See test accompanying note 101 infra.
H4 \\'eels
left unresolved many questions concerning the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule. It did not make clear whether the amendment describes rights held collectively by

"
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Silverthorne Lumber Co. v . United States85extended the exclusionary rule to the fruits of illegal searches and seizures. Government
agents seized corporate records from Silverthorne's offices. The government photographed the seized records before the district court
could act on defendants' application for their return. The originals
were then returned pursuant to the district court's order, and an
indictment was secured based in part upon the photographed documents. The government then subpoenaed the original documents and,
upon defendants' refusal to produce them, obtained a contempt adjudication, from which defendants brought a writ of error. The Court
held that the subpoena was unenforceable because it was based upon
information gained from the government's unlawful conduct,8anoting
that "[tlhe essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."87
Thus the Court appeared to insist that the government in no way be
permitted to profit from its illegal a c t i v i t i e ~ . ~ ~

the society at large, or individually, by those aggrieved by police misconduct on a more personal
level; and it did not suggest how far the rule ought to be extended in senrice of \vhichever modcl
was adopted. Professor Amsterdam has referred to the latter model as the atomistic approach
and, with other commentators, has suggested that the Court clearly has adopted this view of thc
amendment. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 367. See also Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and
the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1289 (1981). The \i'cc~k\ Court
did not elaborate upon itsstatement that without exclusion of illegally seized evidence the fourth
amendment would be a nullity. See test accompanying note 78 supra. It may fairly be inferred
that the Court believed that no other remedy would be effective. The Court did mention
potential civil remedies, but it is important to note that here the Court \;,as discussing the
defendant's potential remedies against state law enforcement officials to whom it recognized the
fourth amendment did not apply. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). Accord
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Court may have felt that the defendant was entirely
without a civil remedy with respect to federal law enforcement officials since direct actions
implied under the fourth amendment were not recognized until Bivens v. Sis Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Clearly the Court belivved that the
purpose of the amendment was to prevent the federal government from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures and that prevention could properly be achieved by denying thc
government use of the spoils of its misconduct.
85 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Silverthome, in fact, is properly regarded as the source of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
doctrine though the phrase was not coined until Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939), and mas not fully esplored by the Court until its decision in Wong Sun v. United Stattts.
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
251 U.S. at 392.
Neither Weeks nor Siluerthorne discussed questions of standing; there was no challenge to
petitioners' standing in either case. Whether the Court would have painted with so broad a brush
if the defendants had been less closely connected with the evidence and the places from which it
was seized is a matter for speculation.
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The Weeks and Silverthorne Courts regarded the exclusionary
rule as an indispensable remedy for individual rights. Weeks stated
that fourth amendment rights "might as well be stricken from the
Constit~tion"~~
without the exclusionary rule, and the exclusionary
remedy Weeks prescribed included return of the excluded evidence to
the defendant thus making him whole as well as depriving the government of the use of the evidence. The judicial integrity rationale in
Silverthorne, while apparently an independent ground, also supports
the conclusion that the exclusionary rule primarily served as an individual remedy. The Court demanded that illegally obtained information "find no sanction in the judgments of the Courts"go and that it
"not be used at all."g1 Those concerns, however, were in turn rooted
in the nature of federal courts, which the Court noted "are charged at
all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of
all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such
fundamental rights."g2 Thus remedying breaches of individual rights
dominated the Court's early approach.

2. The Exclusionary Rule and the States
The exclusionary rule was not again closely examined by the
Court until Wolf v . ColoradoQ3declined to apply it to the states. Wolf
was a peculiar case. It had a dual emphasis: the majority not only

In one later case, the Court did give the rule its full scope but without reference to questions
of standing. hlcDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). hlcDonald and Washington were
convicted of operating a lottery, based in part upon evidence seized by the District of Columbia
police from h1cDonaldS room. The Court found the warrantless search unreasonable because the
officers had had enough time to secure a warrant. Id. at 454-56. It then reversed both convictions, hicDonald's because his privacy was invaded and he was entitled under Weeks to return of
the seized materials, and Washington's because, though the Court assumed without deciding
that he had no privacy interest in hicDonaldS room, had the seized evidence been properly
returned to hicDonald, it mould not have been available for use against Washington either. Id.
at 456. Thus the government was denied all the benefit of its unlawful activities.
" 232 U.S. at 393.
OU Id. at 392.
Silcerthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
G2 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
*= 3338 U.S. 25 (1949). Representatives of the Colorado district attorney, acting without a
warrant, arrested Wolf, a physician, for conspiracy to commit abortion. While making the arrest
at his office, they seized certain of his office records, which were subsequently used to convict
him of a different abortion offense from the one the district attorney had been investigating.
\Tolf's suppression motion was denied by the Colorado courts. Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279,
281, 187 P.2d 926, 927 (1947) (en banc), affd, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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recognized the Weeks exclusionary rule and "stoutly adhere[d] to itwo4
but also made it clear that the fourth amendment's guarantees were
regarded as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus
applicable to the states.95 At the same time, the majority carefully
separated the exclusionary rule as a mere judicially created remedy
from the constitutionally created rights of the fourth amendment,
applying the right to the states while declining to apply the remedy.Qu
In the course of making that distinction, the Court rejected Weeks.'
idea that no other effective remedies for fourth amendment violations
existed:
The jurisdictions which have rejected the Weeks doctrine have
not left the right to privacy without other means of protection. . . .
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an
effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this
Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured
by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods
which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effe~tive.~'

The Wolf Court thus seemed to emphasize the deterrent aspects of the
exclusionary rule without discussing the protection of judicial integrity or individual rights under the fourth amendment.gs

338 U.S. at 28.
Id. at 26-28 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)). See also Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362-63 (1959); I n i n r v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954); Stefanelli v. hlinard, 342 U.S. 117, 119 (1951).
Q6 Wolf V. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28, 31 (1949). This separation was firmly rejected by the
Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which, among other things, recognized the rule as
having a firm constitutional basis. See tex* accompanying notes 107-11 infra.
97 338 U.S. at 30-31 (footnote omitted).
Q8 The Wolf opinion drew dissents from three members of the Court. Justice Murphy, joined
in dissent by Justices Douglas and Rutledge, set out at some length his dissatisfaction xipith the
majority's rejection of Weeks'conclusion that the exclusionary rule was the only effective way to
enforce the fourth amendment, reflecting his view of the impracticality of alternative theoretical
methods of enforcement. Id. at 41-44.
By 1955, there was at least some persuasive evidence in the states that Justice hfurphy's
concerns were well founded. Despite Wolfs clear statement that the exclusionary rule would not
be forced upon the states as a matter of due process, several elected to adopt it. California \$.as
one:
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely
failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers
with the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly required
to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers.
. .Experience has demonstrated, however, that neither administrative, criminal nor civil
remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures. The innocent suffer
with the gulity, [sic] and we cannot close our eyes to the effect the rule we adopt u,ill have
on the rights of those not before the court.
O4

QS

.
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Eleven years after Wolf; the Court launched into a more explicit
consideration of the purposes of the exclusionary rule in Elkins v.
United
Elkins implicitly called into question Wolfs idea that
fourth amendment rights and remedies could be dealt with separately. It confirmed the concept of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent
but at the same time merged that purpose with Weeks' dictum that
the fourth amendment would be meaningless without the exclusionary
remedy. loo The Supreme Court ruled that Weeks required rejection of
the silver platter doctrine, which had previously permitted federal
courts to use evidence unlawfully seized by the state.lol In response to
critics' complaints that the rule irrationally permitted criminals to
escape deserved convictions without directly punishing Cardozo's
blundering constable,1O2 the Court pointed out that "these objections
hardly answer the basic postulate of the exclusionary rule itself. The
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."lo3

People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12, 913 (1955). In Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court characterized its decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), as es~licitlyrepudiating the factual bases upon which Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), had rested: "[Tlhe other means of protection had proven to be 'worthless and futile' and
had not reduced the incidence of police lawlessness during the 12 years since Wolf was an[Instead] JI'olf had operated as a license for police illegality.
Linkletter v.
nounced.
ltralker. 361 U.S. at 634.
I"' 364 U.S. 206 (1960). State officers executing a search warrant (later determined invalid)
seized certain materials tending to link petitioners with unlawful interception of telephone
conversations. After failure of a state prosecution for possession of obscene materials by reason of
the state culurts' suppression of the seized evidence, a federal prosecution charging conspiracy and
unlawful interception of telephone communications was commenced, using the unlawfully
seized evidence delivered to the federal government by state officials.
'"'JSee test accompanying note 89 supra.
'"l 364 U.S. at 208.
I" Id. at 217 (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence 8 2184 (3d ed. 1940)). See test
accompanying note 76 supra.
IU3
364 US. at 217. The Elkins Court briefly discussed another purpose of the rule: maintaining the integrity of the federal judicial process. Declaring its unwillingness to see the courts
become "accomplices in the willful disobedienceof a Constitution they are w o r n to uphold," id.
at 223, the Court established these considerations as distinct justifications for the esclusionary
rule, citing hlcNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (192s) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting). The judicial integrity theme was subsequently echoed by the Court in hlapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,536 (1975); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,599-600 (1975); and Dunaway
v. New I'ork, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979). By the time Payner v. United States, 447 U.S. 727
(19SO). mas decided, holvever, the importance of this concept had clearly shrunk; the majority
made clear that it \vas entirely subordinate to the question of the defendant's standing. Id. at 736
n.8.

...

. . ."
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In these short sentences, the Court set out two fundamental
postulates of its modern fourth amendment jurisprudence. First, the
Court clearly did not ground application of the rule in an individual
right. The rule, it said, is not designed to return the individual and the
government to the positions they occupied prior to the government's
illegal conduct. It is instead designed forcefully to persuade the police
to honor general fourth amendment principles more scrupulously so
that unlawful conduct will not be repeated.lo4 Second, the Court
explicitly recognized the practical reality Justice Murphy had addressed in Wolf: there is no way to enforce the amendment's guarantees without imposing the exclusionary rule.lo5Thus the Court found
the rule to be essential.
The Elkins view that the rule is indispensable set the stage for the
Court's decision in Mapp v. 0hio,lo6which extended the exclusionary
rule to the states as a matter of constitutional law. In Mapp, the Court
emphatically repudiated the assumption of Wolf v. Colorado1" that
the fourth amendment right could be separated from the exclusionary
rule remedy: lo8
[I]n extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was

lo4 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 n.29 (1976): " 'The rule is unsupportable a
s
reparation or compensatory dispensation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is
the experience of its indispensability in "exert[ing] general legal pressures to secure obediencc to
the Fourth Amendment on the part of federal law-enforcing officers." ' " (quoting Am.;terdam,
Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378,388-89 (1964) (footnotes
omitted)). But see Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 n.10 (1968) (suggesting that onc
of the exclusionary rule's benefits is that it "restores the situation that u,ould have prevailed if the
Government had itself obeyed the law").
lo5 See note 98 supra. As the Court recognized, this point of view was not peculiar to Justice
Murphy. In fact, the Court, by quoting at length from Justice Jackson's dissent in Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), credited him rather than Justice hiurphy with the initiiil
statement of this position. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217-18 (1960).
lo6 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Ohio police officers broke into hlapp's home, allegedly to search for
gambling paraphernalia and an individual for whom they had an arrest warrant. Though at the
time the police claimed to have a search warrant as well, it was never produced at trial. The
officers did not find what they sought, but, in the general search of the house, they did discover
sexually oriented printed matter, for possession of which hfapp was convicted.
lo'
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
lo* In fact, the Mapp Court characterized this portion of Wolf as establishing a double
standard. 367 U.S. at 658. The Court's rejection of the Wolf assumption was unequivocal.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them
by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it
othenvise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and undeserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom
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logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part of the right to privacy-be also insisted
upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf case. log

In fact, the Court traced the constitutional basis for the exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence back to 1886, noting that it had, even
then, condemned use of unlawfully seized evidence as unconstitutional."O And, citing Weeks, the Mapp Court made clear the longstanding constitutional basis for the rule:
[I]n that case [we] clearly stated that use of the seized evidence
involved "a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused. . . ."
This Court has ever since required of federal law officers a strict
adherence to that command which this Court has held to be a
clear, specific, and constitutionally required-even if judicially
implied-deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the
Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to "a form of

The majority did not, however, further discuss the underlying purposes of the exclusionary rule except by reference to ElkinsH2Justice
Harlan, dissenting, asserted that Weeks' exclusionary rule was intended only to deter police misconduct not to repair it.H3That formufrom state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nesus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
merit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To
hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."
Id. at 655-56 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,217 (1960)). See text accompanying
note 103 supra.
I*' 367 U.S. at 655-56.
l I U Id. at 647 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886)).
367 U.S. at 648 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,398 (1914) and Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). See generally Schrock & Welsh, Up
From Calandra: The Esclusionary Rule As a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 251
(1974). Both before and after hlapp, a few decisions have regarded the exclusionary rule as an
evidentiary rule, not of constitutional stature. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132
(1954) (plurality opinion); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 440, 282 P.2d 905, 908 (1955);
Webster v. State, 59 Del. 54, 60, 213 A.2d 298, 301 (1965).
11V67U.S. at 656.
113 Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting): "[Tlhe Week exclusionary rule is but a remedy which,
by penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at deterring such conduct in the future."
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lation would characterize the Court's later approach as the individual
remedy and judicial integrity concerns tended to vanish from exclusionary rule jurisprudence altogether.

3. The Exclusionary Rule Outside of Criminal Trials
In United States v . Calandra,l14 the Court's attention shifted
from questions of which sovereigns were bound by the fourth amendment-the issue in Weeks, Wolf, Elkins, and Mapp-to questions of
what parts of the governmental process were affected by fourth
amendment requirements. The Court decided Calandra solely on
deterrence grounds. Calandra was subpoenaed by a federal grand
jury and moved to suppress evidence upon which the grand jury's
questions to him were based because the government had unlawfully
seized it from him. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
order granting suppression on the ground that applying the exclusionary rule in the grand jury context would not produce sufficient deterrence to justify use of the rule.l15 In reaching that conclusion, the
Court focused upon the purposes of the rule as seen by the majority:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury
to the privacy of the search victim: "[Tlhe ruptured privacy of the
victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes
too late." [Citation omitted.] Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to
deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures. . . . In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrie~ed."~

The majority took the position that the exclusionary rule was
intended not to benefit the individual invoking it but rather was a
remedy with a more general purpose. In Professor Amsterdam's
terms, the majority viewed the rule as a "regulation of governmental
conduct" rather than "a collection of protections of atomistic spheres
of interest of individual ~itizens.""~The Court thus echoed the deter-

"'414 U.S. 338 (1974).
" 5 "Whatever deterrence of police misconduct may result from the exclusion of illegall}.seized
evidence from criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury
proceedings would significantly further that goal." Id. at 351.
Id. at 347-48.
117 Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 367. In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas
and Marshall, took sharp issue with the majority's implication that the exclusionary rule had only
a deterrent purpose. Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court in Weeks v. United States, 232
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rent philosophy of the Elkins Court118but with a difference. In Elkins
the deterrence rationale had been used to expand the scope of fourth
amendment protection through use of the exclusionary rule.
Calandra, however, used the same rationale to circumscribe the
amendment's reach. Because the Court no longer saw the rule as
designed to benefit the individual, it felt free to condition its applicability on the anticipated deterrent effect.llg
continued the trend begun by Calandra.
United States v.
A Los Angeles police officer, executing a warrant authorizing a search
for bookmaking paraphernalia, seized certain records and some cash
from Janis' apartment. The seized evidence was shared with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which thereafter filed an assessment
against Janis and levied upon the funds which had been seized from
him. Subsequently, a state gambling prosecution was begun in which,
on Janis' motion, the warrant was quashed.121 The state court also
ordered that the seized records be returned to him. Janis then brought
a civil proceeding seeking a refund of the assessment, successfully
sought to suppress the IRS copies of the seized records, and won his
refund.lZ2 On review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that the evidence should have been admitted because exclu-

U.S. 383 (1914), had enunciated two more important goals for the exclusionary rule: "enabling
the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the peopleall potential victims of unlawful governmental conduct-that the government would not profit
from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
dissent also traced the continued Supreme Court recognition of those objectives through Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Justice Brennan noted
that the majority in hlapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), had spoken primarily in terms of the
rule's deterrent effect but added that the hlapp Court realized that the rule "gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less
than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity
so necessary in the true administration of justice." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 359-60
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting hlapp, 367 U.S. at 660).
See test accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
llUAs this Article goes to press, the Court is considering whether to extend the Calandra
approach to the traditional criminal law context. In Illinois v. Gates, restored to calendar for
rearyment, 51 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 81-430), it hasscheduled reargument
on the question whether the exclusionary ruleshould be modified to include, for esample, a good
faith esception. The basis for such an esception would be, of course, the belief that good faith
errors cannot be deterred by the exclusionary rule.
la 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
121 The motion to quash was granted on the ground that the affidavit supporting the warrant
was insufficient under the rules enunciated in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969),
decided just before Janis' motion to quash but after issuance and execution of the warrant. 428
U.S. at 437-38.
lZ2 Janis v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tas Cas. (CCH) q 16,083 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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sion would not, given the involvement of different sovereigns, have its
intended deterrent effect.123
Janis thus echoed the trend, begun in C a l a n d ~ a , 'toward
~~
restricting application of the exclusionary rule, even in the face of
clearly unlawful searches and seizures, on the ground that the rule's
deterrent function on society's behalf would not be served and the
individual had no personal right to its invocation.125The Court's
restrictive view of the proper scope of the exclusionary rule demonstrates the widening split between its perception of fourth amendment
rights as exclusively personal and fourth amendment remedies as exclusively collective. This dichotomy will be explored in the next section.

A. The Anomaly and Its Effects:
Rights Without Remedies and Remedies Without Rights

The Court's recent treatment of fourth amendment cases is bifurcated. On one hand, the Court repeatedly insists with respect to
questions of standing that the fourth amendment recognizes rights
belonging to individuals, which may not be vicariously asserted.126
Thus the Court has refused to consider fourth amendment claims of
persons unable to show invasions of their personal privacy, even
"[E]xcIusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the
conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion." 428
U.S. at 454. The Court apparently overlooked its own reasoning in Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960), which rejected evidence offered by a different sovereign on a silver platter for
use in the federal courts. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
12' The restrictive trend had been foreshadowed but was not actually begun until Calandra.
For example, in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), a case involving narcotics charges,
the Court permitted use of illegally seized evidence to impeach the defendant. Walder testified
on direct examination that he had no prior involvement with narcotics. Thereupon the government, over defense objection, introduced evidence of a prior, unlawful seizure of narcotics from
Walder's person. The Court refused to reverse the ensuing conviction, finding the cross-examination proper because defendant's direct testimony had placed the matter in issue. Thus unlawfully
seized evidence was permitted to be used despite the exclusionary rule. The Court did not,
however, comment directly upon how this decision related to the purposes of the exclusionary
rule, and \alder therefore did not give rise to a general doctrine of limiting the exclusionary
rule's application as did Calandra and Ianis two decades later.
428 U.S. at 446 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
lZ8 See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 86-87, 95; Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. at 174.
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though their legal positions were clearly prejudiced by the govern' ~ ~the other hand, the remedy which has been
ment's m i s c ~ n d u c t . On
created in response to law enforcement officials' fourth amendment
violations is said to be not personal but collective,128 designed to
prevent future violations rather than to repair those that have already
occurred.lS Its purpose is not to benefit the individual who invokes it
but instead to protect society by deterring unlawful police behavior.
When the Court speaks of fourth amendment rights, it speaks only of
individuals; when it speaks of remedies, it speaks only of society as a
collective unit. Clearly the Court is operating under different and
inconsistent theories of fourth amendment rights and remedies.130
The effect of this dual approach is unmistakable: the ambit of the
fourth amendment is far smaller under the Court's two-way analysis
than it would be if either of its branches were used consistently to
develop the law of both rights and remedies under the amendment.
For esample, if both fourth amendment substantive rights and the
esclusionary rule remedy were regarded as personal rather than collective, refusal to apply the exclusionary rule in United States v .
CaZandra131 and United States v. J a n i ~ would
l ~ ~ be inappropriate.
Calandra's personal privacy was clearly violated when federal agents
seized the records subsequently used as the basis for the grand jury's
questions to him.133There was no issue concerning his standing. Yet
the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule on the ground that
the rule was a collective remedy, not a personal one, and its application in such circumstances would not have the intended deterrent
effect.13"ecause
of that distinction, Calandra's fourth amendment
rights were without remedy. Had the esclusionary rule been regarded
lW See, e.g., Ramlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83. See test
accompanying notes 46-65 supra.
lEX
See test accompanying notes 114-23 supra.
12" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
13" This inconsistency has been exylored at some length in Burkoff, supra note 12. Professor
Burkoff attributes it to the Court's single-minded pursuit of a narrower scope of the fourth
amendment. He calls on the Court at least to be consistent utilitarians and to recognize that
esyanding the scope of protection would serve important functions. Id. at 174-81.
414 U.S. 338 (1974). See test accompanying notes 114-19 supra.
'" 428 U.S. 433 (1976). See test accompanying notes 120-25 supra.
l m Officers executing a warrant authorizing seizure of gambling paraphernalia discovered
and seized evidence they believed to be relevant to an ongoing investigation of loansharking.
Calandra was subpoenaed by the grand jury with respect to the loansharking investigation. In
the district court, he challenged the seizure of the evidence on the grounds that the affidavit
supporting the warrant was insufficient and that the search had esceeded the scope of the
warrant. The district and circuit courts upheld the challenge, and the government did not seek
review of those findings in the Supreme Court. 414 U.S. at 341-42.
13' See test accompanying notes 114-19 supra.
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as a personal remedy complementary to Calandra's personal fourth
amendment rights, the evidence would have been suppressed and
Calandra would not haye been required to answer the grand jury's
questions. 135
By a similar analysis, the result in United States u.
also
would be reversed. Janis' personal privacy was violated because the
evidence was seized from him by state officers pursuant to an invalid
warrant. The state officials then turned the evidence over to federal
authorities. As in Calandra, there was no question of standing. Yet, as
in Calandra, Janis was denied the benefit of suppression of the evidence on the ground that the deterrent effect of exclusion would be
too attenuated because the sovereign under whose authority the evidence was seized was not the one being punished by its exclusion.
In both Calandra and Janis, the Court declined to apply the
exclusionary rule because it felt the rule's application would not have
a deterrent effect on future police m i s c ~ n d u c t . 'In
~ ~both cases, law
enforcement behavior violating the fourth amendment went unpunished, and the courts proceeded in their duties with the aid of evidence unlawfully procured by the government.13* That result was
possible only because of the Court's view that fourth amendment
rights are personal while the exclusionary rule remedy is collective.
On the other hand, if, to correspond with its view of the esclusionary rule as a collective remedy, the Court also analyzed fourth
amendment rights as having a collective component, the results in the
recent standing cases would be inappropriate. For example, if the
fourth amendment were viewed by the Court as designed to protect
society's collective interest in preventing unlawful police behavior (the
purpose frequently announced for the exclusionary rule),139United

The Calandra Court also addressed the concept of standing, reaffirming the CourtS thcnemerging insistence that fourth amendment claims could not be raised by persons who had not
suffered invasions of their personal rights, narrowly construed. 414 U.S. at 348. But at the same
time, the opinion makes it clear that standing is not premised upon the esclusionary rulv's
deterrent effect. The Court has never found standing on the ground that application of thv
exclusionary rule would create a deterrent effect. Instead, the inquiry is sequential. First. the
Court examines the individual's standing. Second, if the individual is found to have standing, the
Court may use deterrence effectiveness analysis to contract further the application of the
exclusionary rule within the confines of the standing doctrine.
428 U.S. 433 (1976). See text accompanying notes 120-23 supra.
13' See notes 115, 123 and accompanying text supra.
Prior to Calandra and Janb, one of the purposes of the exclusionary rule had been thought
to be maintenance of judicial integrity-the thought that the courts should not become partner,\
in or the beneficiaries of official la\vlessness. See note 103 supra.
13@ See generally tes* accompanying notes 71-125 supra.

Heinonline - - 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 284 1983

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

hiay 19831

FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

255

States u. Saluucci'" ovould have resulted in reversal of the conviction
rather than affirmance. In terms of the government's behavior, the
esistence of probable cause and the need for a warrant, it makes no
difference whether the invaded apartment belonged to Zackular
(Salvucci's codefendant) or Zackular's mother.141 Similarly, in terms
of the illegality of the detention and the resulting search, it is irrelevant from society's viewpoint that in Rawlings u. Kentucky142the
contraband was found in Cox's purse rather than Rawlings'. In both
of these cases, the protection of the exclusionary rule was denied to the
defendants because the Court found that their individual privacy had
not been violated. In both of these cases, law enforcement behavior
violating the fourth amendment went unpunished, and the courts
admitted evidence unlawfully procured by the government. The
result was possible only because of the Court's view that fourth
amendment rights are personal while the exclusionary rule remedy is
collective. Thus the result of the Court's bifurcated approach is grossly
diminished fourth amendment protection; neither the right's nor the
remedy's objectives are being consistently served.
What is troublesome about the Court's approach, at least in part,
is the discontinuity of its analysis. The Court is using two analytically
distinct approaches to analyze fourth amendment cases, and these
approaches are fundamentally at war with each other. This is, to put
it charitably, intellectually unsatisfying. In some sense, each body of
case law es~lainswhy the other is wrong. At the very least, the Court
ought to choose one approach or the other and use it consistently. Yet
such a choice mould do considerable violence to established fourth
amendment values which have been recognized over the years for
sound reasons of policy. More than intellectual inconsistency is at
stake. The Court's dual approach, as well as any simple application of
either aspect of it, creates serious deficiencies in the scheme of fourth
amendment rights and remedies. First, the individual is in many cases
left with no remedy for infringements of fourth amendment rights.
Second, the collective interest implied by the exclusionary rule decisions is not meaningfully anchored by the Court to a collective fourth
amendment right. From a doctrinal standpoint, therefore, the prefer-

I4O

445 U.S. 83 (1980).See test accompanying notes 54-57supra.

The courts are not clear about whose apartment was invaded. The Supreme Court says it
belonged to Zackular's mother, 448 U.S. at 85,but the circuit court said it was his wife's. United
States v. Salwcci, 599 F.2d 1094, 1094 (1st Cir. 1979), rev'd, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). For purposes of
assessing the illegality of the police behavior or Salvucci's standing to challenge it, the difference
is insignificant.
""4s
U.S. 95 (1980). See test accompanying notes 58-66supra.
14'
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able solution would be to recognize the existence of the unarticulated
collective right and individual remedy.
One may legitimately inquire what the individual's remedy is for
violation of his fourth amendment rights if it is not the exclusionary
rule. Specifically, in cases where the individual clearly has standing to
seek suppression of illegally seized evidence, the Court has said that
his standing derives from a recognizable violation of his individual
rights.143Yet the Court also instructs that exclusion of the fruits of an
illegal search or seizure is not for the benefit of the individual or to
vindicate any right of his,144and Mapp v. Ohio145made it clear that
the Court was unable seriously to regard civil, criminal, or administrative remedies as sufficient p r o t e ~ t i o n . ' ~ ~
What, then, does vindicate the individual's violated fourth
amendment rights? The obvious answer, recognized in early cases
though resisted by the present Court, is that the exclusionary rule does
double duty, and in fact is partially designed to repair the damage to
the individual by returning him and the government as nearly as
possible to the positions they occupied prior to the unlawful governmental activity.14' The Court, especially in the earliest exclusionary
rule cases, recognized as much.148As recently as Mapp, the Court
explicitly recognized the exclusionary rule as an individual remedy
tailored in part to an individual right despite its earlier disclaimer of
that concept in elk in.^.'^^ Were it not for this link, the Court would
have been faced with the prospect of the existence of a fundamental
right150 for which neither the Constitution nor the courts had provided any remedy. This is, in fact, the consideration which led to
Weeks' creation and Mapp's extension of the rule.151
The second question arising from the Court's dual approach is
whether its conception of the exclusionary rule as a collective remedy

See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
At least one lower court has suggested that the exclusionary rule was intended in part to
remedy the harm done to the individual. Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 (1972). The
Supreme Court repudiated that suggestion in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Set.
note 104 supra.
14s 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14B Id. at 651-53.
147 This concept was mentioned by the Court in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224
n.10 (1968), but has not been adopted. In fact, it clearly runs directly opposite to Elkin\'
"prevent not repair" concept. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
See test accompanying notes 82-92 supra.
14@ 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
150 The individual's right under the fourth amendment was declared to be fundamental in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
151 See generally test accompanying notes 18-70 supra.
143

14'
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necessarily implies the concomitant esistence of a collective fourth
amendment right.152Remedies do not exist in the absence of perceived
(though possibly unarticulated) rights.153Indeed, it is the pressure of
violated rights that creates the impetus for legislatures and courts to
invent appropriate remedies. The Court's repeated insistence that the
exclusionary rule is not personal to the accused but is a judicially
created remedy designed to vindicate a societal interest is thus an
affirmation of the existence of a juridically cognizable societal interest.15"
The Court's present scheme fails to address the full range of
interests, collective as well as individual, that should be protected by
1" California has esplicitly recognized this in construing its constitutional analogue to the
fourth amendment, Cal. Const. art. 1, 3 13.
Thus, when consideration is directed to the question of the admissibility of evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional provisions, it bears emphasis that the court is not
concerned solely with the rights of the defendant before it, however guilty he may appear,
but with the conrtitutional right of all the people to be secure in their homes, persons and

c%fcct.s.

People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,439,282 P.2d 905,907 (1955) (emphasis added). In part, it was
the recognition of this interest that caused California to discard standing requirements entirely in
fourth amendment questions. See note 178 infra.
'"A remedy is defined
as 'the means employed to enforce a right, or redress an injury.' "
Knapp, Stout cYr Co. v. hlccaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 644 (1900).
Rrmedies, in their widest sense, are either the final means by which to maintain and
defend primary rights and enforce primary duties, or they are the final equivalents given to
an injured person in the place of his original primary rights which have been broken, and
of the original primary duties toward him which have been unperformed.
J. Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights by the Civil Action 2 (1876).
IT' The concept of constitutional rights being collectively held is by no means a new one. The
Court has long treated the rights of assembly and association under the first amendment as
having collective aspects. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama es rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1955);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). Similarly, in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), the Court noted that
the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right
to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
paramount.
esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
hiost recently, the Court held that there is a public right under the first amendment to attend
trials. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Pel1 v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942) (recognizing a collective statutory right as having been created by
Congress in the Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. 88 151-155 (1976)); Newman v. Piggie
Park Enters.. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) @er curiam) (recognizing the individual as a private attorney
general vindicating the collective interest of others pursuant to congressional policy reflected in
title I1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 85 2000a-2000h-6 (1976)). Thus some
constitutional and legislative provisions are viewed as having both individual and collective
components. And indeed, this is hardly surprising under a Constitution which begins with the
phrase "We the People" and is regarded as the quintessential example of a compact of society
with itself.

...

'"

...
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the fourth amendment.155Current fourth amendment jurisprudence
funnels all claims through the individual standing doctrine and only
thereafter considers whether collective security is furthered by application of the exclusionary rule, further constricting fourth amendment
protection. Thus collective security interests are never the initial inquiry in the analysis. As argued above, this bifurcated approach serves
neither the individual nor the collective interest; 1 5 ~still less does it
serve the whole range of protected fourth amendment interests.
The explanation almost certainly lies in the Court's dissatisfaction
with the exclusionary rule.15' Regarding the rule as only one of many
possible remedies, the Court elects to apply it only in the narrow
range of circumstances in which it is felt to be most effective.15*Such a
choice might be permissible if the Court were simply choosing one
fourth amendment remedy from a larger arsenal. Its decisions would
then be no more controversial than, for example, the customary denial of injunctive relief when damages are an adequate remedy. But
that is not the situation. Having acknowledged the proper range of
fourth amendment protection, the Court has refused to tailor its
remedies to match. The Court's scheme is both inconsistent and incomplete. The Court has a responsibility to provide a network of
remedies broad enough to protect both the individual and the collective rights under the fourth amendment.15$ Some combination of
remedies must vindicate both individual and collective fourth amendment interests, or large parts of the amendment will remain a nullity.
This Article proceeds on the assumption that the Court's partial
picture of the fourth amendment must be supplemented. The Court
itself should do so; Congress has not acted in the nearly seventy years
since the announcement of the exclusionary rule and is unlikely to do
so.lBOMoreover, the Court's artificial constriction of fourth amendSee text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
See text accompanying notes 126-42 supra.
See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting) ("If the Court is troubled by the practical
impact of the esclusionary rule, it should face the issue squarely instead of distorting other [LC.
standing] doctrines in an attempt to reach what are perceived as the correct results in specific
cases."); see also note 119 supra. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S.388,411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (advocating abandonment of
the exclusionary rule and development of alternative remedies).
lS8 See text accompanying notes 114-25 supra.
lS9 While the Court, following the lead of Justice Burger, may question the efficacy of the
exclusionary rule and search for alternatives, it should heed the Chief Justice's warning that the
rule should not be discarded until substitutes are in place. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 420-21 (Burger,
C. J., dissenting).
lea See Amsterdam, supra note 2:
The long-time, wholesale 'legislative default' in regulating police practices is no accident.
Legislatures have not been, are not now, and are not likely to become sensiti\,e to the
lS5

lSs
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ment rights warps the utility of possible alternative remedies. Even if
Congress were to provide them, they would be controlled by the
Court's definition of the scope of the right. Remedies as such are not
the primary problem; it is the Court's failure to articulate the collective right which its esclusionary rule decision^'^' implicitly recognize
and its further failure to provide remedies for the already recognized
individual right.

B. The Individual Right Unvindicated
Because the exclusionary rule is, in part, an individual remedy,
some of the Court's decisions refusing to apply it in cases where the
individual clearly has standing require reexamination. In Caland~a
and Janb, the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule because it
asserted that the rule's use in those contexts would not further the
rule's deterrent purpose.lB2This focuses inappropriately upon the
fourth amendment's collective aspect to the neglect of its individual
aspect. The esclusionary rule is, in part, an individual remedy corresponding to an individual right, and the Court has recognized as
much from the day it created the rule.lB3 Refusal to apply it in

..

concern of protecting persons under investigation by the police.
. [Rather than undertake serious institutional change, legislatures will tend to perpetuate] the myth that crime
is simply a matter of criminals who can be brought to book in due order if the police are
given a free hand and sufficient hardware. Under this view, if the police fail to solve the
crime problem or commit escesses in their zealous efforts to solve it, they are left holding
the bag. There seems to me little doubt which ticket most legislators will choose to run on,
now or in the future.
Id. at 378-79. Amsterdam goes on to opine that only constitutional decisons by the Court (or the
apprehension of them) will move legislatures to action. Id. at 379.
Further aggravating the situation is the Court's historical willingness to take responsibility
for this area of the law. It fashioned the esclusionary rule as well as the Bioens remedy. Perhaps
the legislature regards the fourth amendment, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as
the Court's problem.
lo' See test accompanying notes 71-125 supra.
' " T h e Court has never supported its assertion that deterrrence of unlawful governmental
conduct will not result from suppression of all evidence come by illegally, whatever the procedural contest. Thus this argument is itself suspect; the Court suggests no basis for distinguishing
the remedial effect of suppression on an officer's behavior when the evidence is offered at trial
from when it is offered to a grand jury.
See test accompanying notes 147-51 supra. Cynics may note, of course, that the only time
the Court has insisted the amendment is designed to protect individuals from governmental
invasion of privacy is when it is about to declare that the privacy of the individual claiming
fourth amendment protection was not invaded thus denying his claim for relief. See, e.g.,
Alderman, Raka~,Rawlings, and Saloucci; test acc~rn~anyingnotes
38-66 supra. Similarly, the
only time the Court insists that the esclusionary rule is a collective remedy is when the individual
claiming the fourth amendment protection clkarly has had his individual privacy invaded, but
the Court does not wish to apply the esclusionary rule for his benefit. See, e.g., Calandra and
Ianir.. The Court thus singlemindedly refers to the individual and collective articulations selec-
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situations such as those presented in Calandra and Janb gives rise to
two bad results. First, it leaves individual fourth amendment rights
wholly without effective remedy. Second, it teaches government that
any person's fourth amendment rights may be violated without penalty except when the government seeks to use the fruits of the search
against that person in a criminal trial. Both of these results do violence
to the Court's repeated insistence that the fourth amendment is designed to protect individuals from government invasions of their privacy. The way to avoid both results is to recognize that the esclusionary rule is appropriately invoked on behalf of the individual as \ire11 as
society at large thus providing the individual remedy to correspond
with the individual right the Court has recognized.
In order for the exclusionary rule to serve as an individual remedy, the Court would have to alter its standing doctrine. Universal
standing is not required, but something like the Jones target theory lCi4
is, for the obvious reason that only criminal defendants invoke the
exclusionary rule. If the government violates some third party's privacy to obtain evidence against a defendant, current standing doctrine drives a wedge between the person with the means to invoke the
rule, the defendant, and the person with the fourth amendment cause
of action, the third party. The target theory of standing would remedy the situation by recognizing that a defendant convicted by use of
illegally obtained evidence suffers a cognizable fourth amendment
injury.
Only the Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule had
led it to narrow its concept of what constitutes a fourth amendment
injury, but the Court should not let an important constitutional right
go without remedy simply because alternative remedies, thus far unarticulated by the Court, might conceivably supply the missing answer. The Court's deterrence rationale for withholding fourth amendment protection teaches the government that it may violate individual
rights in many contexts. Fourth amendment remedies, whatever they
are, must correspond to the fourth amendment rights recognized'by
the Court.
C. Collective Rights
1. The Collective Right Unvindicated

The Court's implicit recognition through a deterrence rationale
of a societal interest compels a return to the question of how that
tively in such a may as always to refuse relief to the individual. See generally Burkoff, supra note
12.
See test accompanying note 28 supra.
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interest is to be vindicated. The difficulties of securing law enforcement compliance with the principles of the fourth amendment led to
the adoption of the esclusionary rule as a constitutionally based remedy.165 In the years following Weeks, the remedy was thought to be
effective,166but recent fourth amendment cases cast doubt on that
conclusion. In many cases, because of the Burger Court's new standing rules, law enforcement conduct violating the fourth amendment
has not been deterred.167Moreover, those rules have actually encouraged law enforcement officials deliberately to violate fourth amendment principles because they know that the fruits of such violations
will not be escluded and will benefit the government's case.
United States v . PaynerlB8exemplifies that cynical reliance upon
the new standing rules. While investigating American citizens' financial connections in the Bahamas, government agents surreptitiously
seized a bank officer's briefcase, photographed its contents and returned the case to his possession. Thereafter the photographs were
used as the basis for subpoena of the original documents, which
helped to convict Payner of falsifying his income tax return. The
Court, following United States v . Miller169and Rakas v . Illinois,170
held that Payner was not entitled to suppression of the documents
because his privacy had not been violated; he had no legitimate
espectation of privacy in either the bank's records or the bank officer's
briefcase.171 Therefore, despite the majority's declaration that "[nlo
court should condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal be-

l''i
See Linkletter v. Walker, 351 U.S. 618,634 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,648,65657 (1961); test accompanying notes 106-13 supra.
l ' " Perhaps equally important, the remedy was not perceived by the Mapp Court as having
hindered effective law enforcement on the federal level.
[It cannot] lightly be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the exclusionary rule
fetters law enforcement. Only last year this Court eqressly considered that contention and
found that "pragmatic evidence of a sort" to the contrary was not wanting. Elkins v .
United States,
[364 U.S. 206,J 218. The Court noted that
"The federal courts themselves have operated under the exclusionary rule of Weeks
for almost half a century; yet it has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffective, or that the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts has thereby been disrupte'd. Moreover, the
The movement towards the rule of excluexperience of the states is impressive.
sion has been halting but seemingly inexorable." Id., at 218-219.
hlapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961).
l'" See test accompanying notes 131-42 supra.
"Y
447 U.S. 727 (1960).
I"' 425 U.S. 435 (1976). hfiller held that bank records are the bank's property not the
depositor's; the individual has no privacy espectation with respect to them.
lil' 439 U.S. 125 (1978). See test accompanying notes 46-53 supra.
447 U.S. at 731-32.

...

...
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havior of those who planned and executed this 'briefcase caper,' "17"
the evidence was received. 173
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, demonstrated at length that the government's agents knew
their activities were illegal but were undeterred nonetheless. The
agents recognized that, under the Court's fourth amendment standing
analysis, evidence thus seized would be admissible against all but the
owner of the briefcase. Justice Marshall quoted the findings of fact
made by the trial court:
"This Court finds that, in its desire to apprehend tas evaders, a
desire the Court fully shares, the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation
permits them to purposefully conduct an uncon.stitutiona1 search
and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against
third parties, who are the real targets of the governmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents in this case acted, and will act in the

future, according to that counsel."174

Id. at 733.
Some things never change. The gowrernment's behavior in Payner bears an eerie resemblance to its earlier activities in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
See test accompanying notes 85-88 supra. The only significant difference is the result; the Courtms
new standing rules led to its acceptance of activities which it had, sixty years earlier, declared
constitutionally repugnant.
I" 447 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added). Justice hlarshall's opinion also noted:
The most disturbing finding by the District Court . . related to the intentional
manipulation of the standing requirements of the Fourth Amendment by agents of the
United States, who are, of course, supposed to uphold and enforce the Constitution and
laws of this country. The District Court found:
"It is evident that the Government and its agents, including Richard Jaffe, were.
and are, well awvare that under the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
evidence obtained from a party pursuant to an unconstitutional search is admissible.
against third parties who's [sic] own privacy espectations are not subject to the search,
even though the cause for the unconstitutional search was to obtain evidence incriminating those third parties. . . Such governmental conduct compels the c.onolusion
that Jaffe and Casper transacted the 'briefcase caper' with a purposeful, bad faith
hostility toward the Fourth Amendment rights of \i701stencroft in order to obtain
evidence against persons like Payner. . ." [footnotes omitted].
The Court of Appeals did not disturb any of these findings. . . Nor does the Court
It is in the contest of these findings-intentional
today purport to set them aside. .
illegal actions by Government agents taken in bad-faith hostility toward the constitutional
rights of Wolstencroft for the purpose of obtaining evidence against persons such a the
respondent through manipulation of the standing requirements of the Fourth Amendment-that the suppression issue must be considered.
Id. at 742-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The majority did note that Congress had looked into the government investigation techniques revealed in Payner and that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue subsequently adopted
guidelines apparently intended to limit such behavior. But even the Payner majority sanethis a a
173

.

.

.

..

.
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The majority, directly confronted by the practical results of its standing doctrine, nevertheless remained ~ n s w a y e d . ' ~ ~
Payner is highly relevant to the concept of the exclusionary rule
as a collective remedy. One may justly ask what the rule is a remedy
for if such egregious violations are beyond its reach. While the majority's standing analysis in Payner may arguendo be considered to be
consistent with Payner's individual rights under the fourth amendment, it entirely fails to account for the fourth amendment rights of
society-the collective interest in security which justifies deterrence of
violations. It can hardly be less offensive to society that the government illegally seized a briefcase belonging to the bank officer rather
than to Payner. The government's behavior is egregious in either case,
and society's interest in regulating the behavior is equally great. The
vindication of society's interest in preventing unconstitutional government activity is made to hang on the fortuitous circumstance of ownership of the briefcase. The upshot of Payner, therefore, is that the
collective fourth amendment interest in securing proper behavior of

limited step: "[Tlhese measures appear on their face to be less positive than one might expect
Id. at 733 n.5. And the Court did, of
from an agency charged with upholding the law. .
course, allow the evidence to be admitted.
Payner bears out the predictions of prescient commentators who feared that the Court's
standing doctrines would lead the police to violate the fourth amendment rights of "little fish,"
sacrificing the possibility of convicting them in order to obtain evidence to convict "big fish." See
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 433; Burkoff, supra note 12, at 176. By contrast, similar activities
by government officials were seen as fit subjects for criminal prosecution in the case of the
infamous break-in directed at the psychiatrist of an individual suspected to have been involved in
delivering the Pentagon Papers to the press. United States v. Erlichmann, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
The dissenters urged unsuccessfully that the Court suppress the seized evidence under its
supenrisory powers rather than under the fourth amendment. 447 U.S. at 744-51 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, thismas the exact result reached by the district and circuit courts. Id. at 731.
The majority declined to invoke the supervisory power at the instance of an individual unable to
show a violation of his own rights. Id. at 734-35. This limitation by the majority is clearly
inconsistent with the purpose of the Court's exercise of supervisory powers in nonadministrative
matters. Indeed, logic suggests that if the individual can show a violation of his individual rights,
invocation of the Court's supervisory powers would be superfluous. See id. at 748-49 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). They are designed, in part, to vindicate interests not traceable to an individual.
For esample, in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), the defendant challenged the
exclusion of women from the grand and petit jury rolls in the Southern District of California.
The Court adjudicated the claim under its supervisory powers without a showing of individual
harm because "[tlhe injury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury to the jury system, to
the lam as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the
processes of our courts." Id. at 195. See also Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power,
69 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 182 (1969): "[The supervisory power] has been regarded as a basis for
implementing constitutional values beyond the minimum requirements of the Constitution, or at
least affording a basis for their implementation on other than constitutional grounds."

. ."
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law enforcement authorities is not being vindicated at
Thus the
Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence as it has developed
in recent years not only restricts the individual to enjoyment of the
benefits of the exclusionary rule in cases where his own (in addition to
society's) fourth amendment rights have been violated,177but also
makes impossible the vindication of society's rights when the individual's rights have not been simultaneously violated. 17*

2. Enforcing the Collective Right
The Court should alter this situation by focusing on underlying
fourth amendment values. Recognizing the proper scope of fourth
amendment protection, the Court should explicitly recognize the societal interest for what it is-a collective constitutional right. The challenge presented by the current state of facts is to develop a method by
which the collective right can be vindicated whenever it is violated.
The ultimate question is whether the courts should ever permit the
government to benefit from its unlawful activities. The logical
method of preventing such abuses is the one devised by the Court itself
but which the Court seems to have forgotten. The exclusionary rule
was designed in part for this purpose; 179 the problem of today's fourth
amendment jurisprudence is that the Court is unwilling to prescribe
the medicamentlsOin the cases where it is needed because it dislikes
17s The results of Rawlings, Rakas, and Salvucci further confirm that point. See text accompanying notes 46-66, 139-42 supra.
'71
See text accompanying notes 46-66 supra.
Prior to the adoption of Proposition 8, in which voters amended the state constitution to
eliminate the state exclusionary rule, see Cal. Const., art. I, 3 28(d) (effective June 9, 1882).
California had discarded the concept of standing in search and seizure cases on the ground that
the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule is frustrated if rigid standing concepts apply.
[I]f law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining
evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is to that estent
nullified. . . [A defendant's right to seek suppression] must rest, not on a violation of his
own constitutional rights, but on the ground that government must not be allowed to
profit by its own wrong and thus encouraged in the la\vless enforcement of the law.
Since all of the reasons that compelled us to adopt the exclusionary rule are applicable
whenever evidence is obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees, such evidence is
inadmissible whether or not it was obtained in violation of the particular defendantS
constitutional rights.
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760-61, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955). Similarly, the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 abolishes standing rules in such cases for the same reason. See Hargra\.e,
The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1 (1874).
17@ See text accompanying notes 89-92 supra.
lS0 ''[Tlhe rule is a needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease." Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section
2255, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 389 (1964). This, of course, begs the question of how much is
needed.

.

...
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the side effects.lS1The result is judicial condonation of lawless governmental activity such as in Payner. It is proposed, therefore, that in any
case where the government violates the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule's application is appropriate, for in its absence, there is no
effective deterrent to such violations.
What is proposed here, therefore, is the resurrection (on a different basis) of the target theory of standing mentioned in Jones v.
United Statesls2but rejected by the Court in Rakas v. Illinois.183In the
absence of such a broadened theory of standing, the collective fourth
amendment right cannot be vindicated at aU.lS4Such a reexpansion of

lK1 The Court repeatedly emphasizes the cost to society of suppressing concededly relevant
evidence to deter future government illegalities. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). What the Court has not considered is
the cost to society of failing to penalize the government's disregard of fundamental constitutional
principles. "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve
neither liberty nor safety." B. Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania (1759) (cited in J.
Bartlett, Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 422 (14th ed. Boston 1968) (1st ed. n.p. 1855)).
lh2 See test accompanying notes 28, 164 supra.
'"3 See test accompanying note 48 supra.
I"' This proposal involves an individual defendant vindicating the collective fourth amendment rights in circumstances where his personal privacy was not invaded, and it is this sort of
assertion of the rights of others against which the Court has inveighed. See. test accompanying
notes 18, 46-66 supra. But assertion of the constitutional rights of others is not unknown in
American law. In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), the Court permitted whites who sold
real property to blacks in violation of a restrictive covenant to assert the equal protection rights of
the black purchasers and would-be purchasers in defense to the ensuing damage action on the
ground that those rights could not othenvise be protected. Limiting the traditional standing rule,
the Court asserted that "the reasons which underlie [the Court's] rule denying standing to raise
another's rights, which is only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect
fundamental rights which would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained."
Id. at 257. The Barrows Court viewed the civil damage action against the white sellers as
sufficient to give them the personal stake in the action normally required by standing concepts.
Id. at 254-56; see Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,152 (1970);
Baker v. Cam, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
The Court relied, in part, upon Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951) (organizations permitted to assert first amendment rights of their members);
Helvering v. Gehardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (workers for Port of New York Authority seeking
immunity from federal income taxation permitted to assert constitutional rights of the states of
New Sork and New Jersey to be free of federal taxation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (private school challenging compulsory education law permitted to assert constitutional
rights of parents to control education of their children). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (beer vendor permitted to assert equal protection rights of prospective purchasers);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (distributors of contraceptives barred to unmarried users
by state law had standing to challenge the statute and assert the constitutional privacy rights of
prospective users). See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the
Supreme Court, 71 Sale L.J. 599 (1962); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88
Haw. L. Rev. 423 (1974). In the typical case involving fourth amendment claims, the individual
has at least as much at stake in the action as was present in Barrows: he stands to be convicted
and imprisoned by the use of illegally seized evidence. And, as in Barrows, there is no effective
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fourth amendment standing concepts would give the amendment
wider application than it now enjoys. The ultimate effect would be to
raise the possibility of penalizing government conduct which violates
the fourth amendmentlS5in all, or substantially all, of the cases in
which it occurs. Certainly this is a far cry from the situation which
obtains today. And while a broader sweep for the fourth amendment
may be anathema to those of a conservative bent, it is submitted that
the Court's recent attempts to create a narrower amendment have
resulted in lines of analysis irreconcilable with each other because they
lack a consistent, articulable theoretical basis.Is6 That inconsistency
harms the Court as an institution. First, it artificially restricts the
scope of a constitutional provision more than can be analytically
justified, warping the tools of decision to the perceived exigencies of
the moment and raising the suspicion that there are no guiding principles underlying the Court's decisions, but that it is instead demonstrating result-oriented jurisprudence. Second, it undermines respect for
the Court as an institution, because when the means used to reach
decisions become suspect, the decisions themselves and their makers
have abandoned the legitimacy necessary to sustain an institution
which relies upon moral suasion as the basis of its power. Reconciliation of the Court's divergent and inconsistently applied theories of
decision is therefore required. Adoption of a standing rule consonant
with all of the purposes of the fourth amendment recognized by the
Court over the past hundred years appears to be the only way, short of
repudiating long, well-established lines of decision, of effecting such a
reconciliation. The target theory of standing achieves the necessary
balance between vigorous enforcement of fourth amendment principles and society's need to insure effective prosecution of criminal
activity. Standing under the target theory is appropriately limited to
those individuals having the personal stake in the outcome of the
way for the parties whose rights have been violated, the society as a whole, to vindicate those
rights. It is true, of course, that an individual whose fourth amendment privacy is invaded may
have a civil action against the government for violation of his civil rights either directly under the
fourth amendment, as in Bivens v. Siu Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 (1976). Ho\vever, such an
individual may be unable or unwilling to undertake the investment of time and resources to
prosecute such an action. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Ham. L.
Rev. 844, 854-55 (1970). In such a case, there is no spokesman for the public right.
lss Even in those cases where the individual was denied the right to seek suppression. the
Court has never maintained that the police conduct did not violate someone's fourth amendment
rights. I t merely refuses to invoke the fourth amendment where the violation was not of the
defendant's privacy. The net effect is that the governmental conduct which did violate the fourth
amendment goes unpunished.
Is8 See test accompanying notes 126-42 supra.
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controversy which has always been required of a litigant, and yet the
increased availability of fourth amendment challenges will help to
protect society's interest in having government behave within the
limits of the Constitution.

If the courts tolerate fourth amendment violations by allowing
their fruits to be admitted in evidence, then indeed our view of
permissible law enforcement activities will have come full circle. The
fourth amendment was enacted, at least in part, in response to the
colonial exierience with writs of assistance, "which James Otis pronounced 'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that
ever was found in an English law book;' since they placed 'the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer.' "la' In Boyd, Justice
Bradley dwelt upon the essentiality of the amendment's protection to
the American constitutional system.la8It can hardly be seriously contended that the people who designed the fourth amendment to prevent such abuses did not intend it to preclude police invasion of one
person's privacy to secure the conviction of another. Indeed, Boyd
exhorts that the fourth amendment's guarantee not be so narrowly
construed:
[Clonstitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation
of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their
motto should be obsta principiis.lE9

Boyd V. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
Justice Boyd appealed to fundamental values:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his
conviction of some public offence,-it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies
and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment [in Entick v. Carrington, 19
Hov.vell's State Trials (1765)l.
116 U.S. at 630.
IhJ Id. at 635.
lK7
lw
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And, more recently, Justice Brandeis warned of yet another danger of
permitting government to violate the law:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.IQo

Today the Court's face is less resolutely set against condonation of
government as lawbreaker than Justice Brandeis had in mind. In large
part, this has occurred because the Court seems to be afflicted with
tunnel vision: it focuses so intently upon the fourth amendment's
relation to individual rights that it has overlooked the amendment's
collective component, the very aspect of the amendment which the
exclusionary rule is designed to protect. Until the Court again chooses
to recognize that society has a cognizable interest under the fourth
amendment in lawful governmental behavior, that constitutional provision, while perhaps not yet quite the mere form of words Justice
Holmes predicted,lgl is far from the shield against illegal governmental conduct which the framers envisaged.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). See test accompanying note 111 supra.
loo
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